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We investigate whether information sharing among banks has affected credit market 
performance in the transition countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, using 
a large sample of firm-level data. Our estimates show that information sharing is associated 
with improved availability and lower cost of credit to firms. This correlation is stronger for 
opaque firms than transparent firms, and stronger in countries with weak legal environments 
than countries with strong legal environments. In cross-sectional estimates, we control for 
variation in country-level aggregate variables that may affect credit, by examining the 
differential impact of information sharing across firm types. In panel estimates, we also 
control for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level, as well as for changes 
in macroeconomic variables and the legal environment. 
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1  Introduction 
When banks evaluate a request for credit, they can either collect information on the 
applicant first-hand or source this information from other lenders who already dealt with the 
applicant. Information exchange between lenders, can occur voluntarily via “private credit 
bureaus” or be enforced by regulation via “public credit registries”, and is arguably an 
important determinant of credit market performance. Theory suggests that information 
sharing may overcome adverse selection in the credit market (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993) and 
reduce moral hazard, by motivating borrowers to exert high effort in projects and repay loans 
(Padilla and Pagano, 2000). Empirical work has identified a positive correlation between 
measures of information sharing and aggregate credit (Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer, 2007), 
as well as a negative correlation between information sharing and default risk (Jappelli and 
Pagano, 2002). 
Information sharing should be particularly relevant for credit market performance in 
countries with weak company law and creditor rights. Lack of transparency in corporate 
reporting, due to weak company law, increases information asymmetries in the borrower-
lender relationship, reducing incentives for banks to lend. Moreover, weak creditor rights 
make banks more reluctant to lend to risky firms, as contract enforcement is costly or 
impossible. The screening and incentive effects of information sharing can mitigate both of 
these problems. 
In this paper we attempt to shed light on the role of information sharing in countries with 
weak company law and creditor rights. We analyze the impact of private credit bureaus and 
public credit registries on the availability and cost of credit to firms in 24 transition countries 
of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
1 Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer (2000) document 
that in these countries the legal environment is particularly unfavorable for lending. 
Moreover, transition countries are an interesting sample to study because some of them have 
recently experienced both strong credit market development and considerable institutional 
                                                 
1 We examine data from 24 transition countries, which we classify into three groups according to their 
status in 2005: European Union (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia); Commonwealth of Independent States (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine); Other European Countries (Albania, Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia & Montenegro). We exclude the CIS 
countries Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan due to lack of data.   2
change, including the introduction of information sharing systems. Private sector credit has 
climbed from just 15% of GDP in 1999 to 25% at the end of 2004.
2 The quality of lending has 
also strongly improved, with the ratio of non-performing loans in banks’ portfolios falling 
from more than 20% in 1999 to just 10% at the end of 2004. Over the same period, seven 
public registries and seven private credit bureaus have emerged in these countries. 
To measure credit market performance, we use firm-level data on credit access and cost of 
credit, drawn from the EBRD/World Bank “Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey” (BEEPS), a representative and large sample of firms. We relate this 
firm-level credit data to country-level indicators of information sharing, compiled from the 
“Doing Business” database of the World Bank/IFC (World Bank, 2006).   
There are two main benefits from investigating the impact of information sharing using our 
data set. First, firm-level data allow us to identify the firms that benefit more from 
information sharing arrangements. For instance, firms that are opaque and costly to screen 
may gain greater access to credit after the introduction of a credit registry or bureau. We can 
thus overcome the limitations of aggregate data, which confound the effect of information 
sharing on individual firms with that arising from compositional changes in the set of firms 
who obtain credit. The second reason for using the BEEPS data is methodological: it allows 
us to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level, changes in macroeconomic 
variables and changes in the legal environment, using panel data constructed from the 2002 
and 2005 surveys. As far as we are aware, this is the first study to use firm-level panel data to 
investigate the relation between information sharing and credit availability. Previous analyses 
are either based on country-level data (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; Djankov et al., 2007) or on 
cross-sectional firm-level data (Galindo and Miller, 2001; Love and Mylenko, 2003).  
Both our cross-sectional estimates and our panel estimates show that on average 
information sharing is associated with more abundant and cheaper credit. Moreover, the 
cross-sectional correlation between credit availability and information sharing is stronger for 
opaque firms than transparent ones, where transparency is defined as the reliance on external 
auditors and the adoption of international accounting standards. Panel estimates also suggest 
that small firms benefit more from information sharing than larger ones. Taken together, these 
two results are consistent with the view that information sharing is particularly valuable in 
                                                 
2 The statistics in this paragraph are unweighted country averages, drawn from the EBRD Transition 
Report (EBRD, 2003; EBRD, 2005).    3
guiding banks to evaluate credit applicants who would otherwise be too costly to screen. Our 
results further reveal that the relation between information sharing and credit access (cost) is 
stronger in countries with weaker legal environments. This finding confirms the conjecture 
that information sharing is particularly valuable to banks in countries where weak company 
and bankruptcy law increase the cost of client screening and contract enforcement. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review and 
presents the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 describes the data and the specification to be 
estimated. Sections 4 and 5 present the results obtained with cross-sectional and panel data, 
respectively. Section 6 summarizes our findings. 
 
2  Effects of Information Sharing 
In this section we review the models proposed in the literature to capture the effects of 
information sharing on credit market performance, using them to draw testable predictions for 
our empirical analysis. We also set our work against the existing empirical evidence in this 
area, to highlight the value added of our contribution. 
 
2.1  Theory 
By exchanging information about their customers, banks can improve their knowledge of 
applicants’ characteristics, past behavior and current debt exposure. In principle, this 
reduction of informational asymmetries can reduce adverse selection problems in lending, as 
well as change borrowers’ incentives to repay, both directly and by changing the 
competitiveness of the credit market. It can also reduce each bank’s uncertainty about the total 
exposure of the borrower, in the context of multiple-bank lending. The implied effects on 
lending, interest rates and default rates have been modeled in several ways.
3 
Pagano and Jappelli (1993) show that information sharing reduces adverse selection by 
improving bank’s information on credit applicants. In their model, each bank has private 
information about local credit applicants, but no information about non-local applicants. If 
banks exchange information about their client’s credit worthiness, they can assess also the 
                                                 
3 See Jappelli and Pagano (2006) for a comprehensive overview of theory and evidence on information 
sharing.   4
quality of non-local credit seekers, and lend to them as safely as they do with local clients. 
The impact of information sharing on aggregate lending in this model is ambiguous. When 
banks exchange information about borrowers’ types, the increase in lending to safe borrowers 
may fail to compensate for an eventual reduction in lending to risky types.  
Information sharing can also create incentives for borrowers to perform in line with banks’ 
interests. Klein (1982) shows that information sharing can motivate borrowers to repay loans, 
when the legal environment makes it difficult for banks to enforce credit contracts. In this 
model borrowers repay their loans because they know that defaulters will be blacklisted, 
reducing external finance in future. Vercammen (1995) and Padilla and Pagano (2000) show 
that if banks exchange information on defaults, borrowers are motivated to exert more effort 
in their projects. In both models default is a signal of bad quality for outside banks and carries 
the penalty of higher interest rates, or no future access to credit. Padilla and Pagano (1997) 
show that information sharing can also mitigate hold-up problems in lending relationships, by 
eliciting more competition for borrowers and thereby reducing the informational rents that 
banks can extract. The reduced hold-up problems can elicit higher effort by borrowers and 
thereby make banks willing to lower lending rates and extend more credit.
4 
Finally, when a customer can borrow from several banks, each of these may be uncertain 
about the customer’s total exposure, and therefore about his ability to repay. Bennardo, 
Pagano and Piccolo (2007) show that the danger of overlending that stems from this 
uncertainty may result in inefficiently scarce credit. Insofar as it makes lending safer, 
information sharing about seniority or debt exposure can raise investment and welfare.  
Given the variety of the informational problems considered in these models, it is not 
surprising that the predicted effects of information sharing on the volume of lending are not 
identical across models. For instance, in the adverse selection model of Pagano and Jappelli 
(1993) the effect on lending is ambiguous, while it is positive in the hold-up model of Padilla 
and Pagano (1997) and in the multiple-bank lending model of Bennardo et al. (2007). The 
effect on lending also depends on the type of information being shared: in the model by 
Padilla and Pagano (2000), sharing only default information increases lending above the level 
                                                 
4 Bouckaert and Degryse (2004) and Gehrig and Stenbacka (2007) show that if banks compete ex ante 
for clients and customers face switching costs, future informational rents foster banking competition. 
Since information sharing reduces these rents, in these models it reduces competition, in contrast to 
Padilla and Pagano (1997).  
   5
reached when banks also share their data about borrowers’ characteristics. Therefore, whether 
information sharing is associated with increased lending is left to the empirical evidence. 
In contrast, these models offer qualitatively similar predictions about the effect of 
information sharing on the probability of default and interest rates: they all predict that, in one 
form or another, communication among banks tends to reduce defaults and thereby 
equilibrium interest rates. But this prediction is unambiguous only if referred to the 
probability of default of an individual borrower. When one considers the average default rate, 
composition effects may overturn the prediction. Suppose that information sharing gives 
lower-grade borrowers access to credit. Even if each borrower’s probability of default is 
reduced, the aggregate default rate may increase because the relative weight of lower-grade 
borrowers increases in the total pool. This biases the estimates against the models’ prediction 
that information sharing reduces defaults and interest rates. Thus here is an instance where, in 
empirical research, borrower-level data may have an edge over aggregate measures. Being 
free of these composition effects, microeconomic data allow a sharper test of this prediction. 
Which firms should benefit more from information sharing between lenders? The stylized 
models discussed so far offer no predictions about how information sharing affects credit 
availability and interest rates depending on borrowers’ characteristics, such as firm size or 
accounting standards. But such predictions can be generated by considering how these 
characteristics affect the banks’ incentive to rely on information sharing rather than on direct 
screening. If direct screening has fixed costs for banks, one may expect that small firms will 
benefit more from information sharing. Without information sharing, banks would only offer 
credit to large firms, for whom it pays to screen; with information sharing, banks can also 
lend to small firms, since they can acquire information on these firms at low cost. A firm’s 
informational transparency – as measured for instance by reliance on international accounting 
standards or on external auditors – plays a similar role as firm size: direct screening is more 
cost effective when applied to firms with more transparent accounts, so that without 
information sharing these firms are more likely to get credit than opaque ones. The 
introduction of information sharing will enable banks to lend more easily also to opaque 
firms, by relying on non-accounting information from previous creditors.  
This discussion suggests that, in addition to investigating the average effect of information 
sharing on the availability and cost of credit, our firm-level analysis should also examine its   6
differential effect depending on firm size and transparency. We study these differential effects 
by conducting sample splits based on these firm characteristics.  
  
2.2  Empirical Evidence 
A growing body of empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that information sharing 
enhances credit market performance. Analyses of credit bureau data confirm that credit 
reporting reduces the selection costs of lenders by allowing them to more accurately predict 
individual loan defaults (Barron and Staten, 2003; Kallberg and Udell, 2003; Powell, Miller, 
Mylenko, and Majnoni 2004; Luoto, McIntosh, and Wydick, 2007). Experimental evidence 
by Brown and Zehnder (forthcoming) shows that a public credit registry can motivate 
borrowers to repay loans, when they would otherwise default. 
The impact of information sharing on aggregate credit market performance has been tested 
by two cross-country studies. Based on their own survey of credit reporting in 43 countries, 
Jappelli and Pagano (2002) show that bank lending to the private sector is larger and default 
rates are lower in countries where information sharing is more solidly established and 
extensive. These cross-sectional relations persist also controlling for other economic and 
institutional determinants of bank lending, such as country size, GDP, growth rate, and 
variables capturing respect for the law and protection of creditor rights. Djankov et al. (2007) 
confirm that private sector credit relative to GDP is positively correlated with information 
sharing in their recent study of credit market performance and institutional arrangements in 
129 countries for the period 1978-2003. 
Firm-level data suggests that information sharing may indeed have a differential impact on 
credit availability for different firm types, in line with the discussion in the previous 
subsection. Love and Mylenko (2003) combine cross-sectional firm-level data from the 1999 
World Bank Business Environment Survey with aggregate data on private and public 
registries collected in Miller (2003). They find that private credit bureaus are associated with 
lower perceived financing constraints and a higher share of bank financing, while public   7
credit registries are not. They also find that small and young firms benefit particularly from 
information sharing.
5  
Given that the above studies rely either on aggregate credit information or on cross-
sectional firm-level data, they cannot clearly disentangle the effect of information sharing 
from that of firm-level characteristics and of other country-level institutional factors. By 
relying on panel data, our paper provides the first test that controls both for unobserved firm-
level heterogeneity and for changes in other relevant country-level variables. Controlling for 
the latter is especially important in the context of the rapid institutional and economic changes 
experienced by transition economies.  
3  Data 
We draw our data from two main sources. Country level data on information sharing is 
taken from the World Bank / IFC “Doing Business” database. We relate this to firm-level 
information on credit availability taken from the EBRD/World Bank Business Environment 
and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS). 
 
3.1  Information Sharing  
Between 1991 and 2005 information sharing institutions were established in 17 of the 27 
transition countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Table 1 provides an 
overview of public credit registries (Panel A) and private credit bureaus (Panel B) in 24 
transition countries at the end of 2005. The main sources of these data are the “Doing 
Business” surveys, conducted by the World Bank/IFC (World Bank, 2006). We complement 
this data with information from our own research
6. Table 1 shows that public registries 
(PCRs) and private bureaus (PCBs) are much more frequent in EU transition countries than in 
                                                 
5 Galindo and Miller (2001) also provide evidence that information sharing reduces credit constraints 
at firm level. Examining balance sheet data of large companies in 23 countries they find a positive 
relation between credit access and an index of information sharing.  
6 The characteristics of the public credit registry in Kazakhstan were provided to us via questionnaire 
by the National Bank of Kazakhstan and the Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan on regulation and 
supervision of financial markets and organizations.
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CIS countries.
7 Indeed today all of the eight EU transition countries have an active PCR, 
PCB, or both. In contrast, only three of the nine covered CIS countries have an operating PCR 
or PCB. The situation is intermediate in other non-EU countries, where in 2004 five out of 
eight feature a PCR, a PCB or both.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
In transition countries it is more common to observe either a PCR or a PCB than both of 
them. In Table 1, thirteen countries have either a PCR or a PCB, and only four have both. 
Public registries in transition countries tend to cover larger loans than private bureaus.
8 Panel 
A shows that seven of the twelve public credit registries only cover loans which exceed per 
capita GDP in their country. Further, while all public credit registries cover loans to firms, 
three do not cover loans to private individuals. In contrast, PCBs tend to focus on credit to 
private individuals and cover even smallest loans. Panel B shows that all nine private credit 
bureaus cover loans to private individuals, while four of them do not cover loans to firms. 
Based on Table 1, we construct an information sharing index for each country and year 
between 1996 and 2004. The index measures the presence and structure of public credit 
registries and private credit bureaus on a scale of 1 to 5. It is constructed as the maximum of 
two scores, one for PCRs and one for PCBs.
9 The PCR score adds one point for fulfilling each 
of the following five criteria: (i) both firms and individuals are covered, (ii) positive and 
negative data is collected and distributed, (iii) the registry distributed data which is at least 
two years old, (iv) the threshold for included loans is below per capita GDP, and (v) the 
registry has existed for more than 3 years.
10 The PCB score is computed in a similar way. 
 
                                                 
7 The CIS countries in our sample are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine. We exclude Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan due 
to lack of data.  
8 This confirms the findings of Miller (2003) for a predominantly Latin American sample. 
9 Computing the information sharing index as the sum of the two scores (instead of the maximum) 
does not change the qualitative results of the estimation. 
10 Our information sharing index is similar to the “Credit Information Index” reported in the “Doing 
Business” data of the World Bank / IFC, although differently from that index we do not consider the 
right of borrowers to access their credit record.    9
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Figure 1 plots the average information index from 1996 to 2004, as well as the PCR and 
PCB scores. The figure highlights that the early years of transition were marked by slow 
emergence of information sharing institutions, driven by the creation of public registries: prior 
to 2000 only six PCR were set up, while only two private credit bureaus emerged.
11 
Information sharing activity accelerated after 2001, and also private arrangements started to 
appear: five public credit registries and seven private credit bureaus were established. This 
fast development appears set to continue in the coming years, with private credit bureaus 
currently under construction in at least seven more countries.
12 
 
3.2  Credit Access 
We relate our information sharing index to firm-level data on credit access taken from the 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS). The EBRD and the 
World Bank conducted this survey jointly in 1999, 2002 and 2005. Our cross-sectional 
analysis is based on data from BEEPS 2002, as this survey version contains the most detailed 
information about firm’s access to credit, and relevant characteristics of firms’ governance 
and management
13. The BEEPS 2002 provides data on 6153 firms in 26 transition countries 
and covers a representative sample of firms for each of these countries.
14 We drop all 
observations from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, due to lack of institutional indicators for these 
countries. This leaves us with a sample of 5717 firms from 24 countries for our cross-
sectional analysis. Our panel analysis is based on responses of 1333 firms who participated in 
both the 2002 and 2005 surveys. In the following we provide a discussion of the data used in 
our cross-sectional analysis. Information on the panel sample is provided in section 5. 
                                                 
11 In 1996 Belarus also introduced a public credit registry. However, the main purpose of this registry 
is to support bank supervision. We therefore do not list it as a public credit registry in our data. 
12 In, , Armenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kazakhstan , Russia, and Serbia projects to establish private credit 
bureaus have been initiated, but these were not operating by the end of 2005.  
13 The 2002 survey contains information about a firm's debt-asset ratio as well as the experience of its 
manager. This information is not available from the more recent 2005 survey version.  
14 The survey covers all countries in which the EBRD is operational, with the exception of 
Turkmenistan. See Fries, Lysenko, and Polanec (2003) for a detailed description of the BEEPS 2002 
survey.    10
For our cross-sectional analysis we use three indicators of firms’ credit access available 
from the BEEPS 2002 survey. Two indicators capture the extent to which access to loans and 
cost of credit constrain firm growth, while a third indicator captures firms’ actual use of 
external finance. In two separate questions, firms were asked how problematic the access to 
financing (as determined by collateral requirements and credit availability) and the costs of 
financing (interest rates and charges) are for the operation and growth of their business. We 
code answers to these questions on a scale from 1 to 4 (1=major obstacle, 2=moderate 
obstacle, 3=minor obstacles, 4=no obstacles) and form our dependent variables Access to 
Finance and Cost of Finance.
15 Therefore, higher values of these two variables indicate an 
improvement in the terms at which credit is available: easier access and lower cost. Besides 
looking at how financing conditions affect firm performance, we also analyze firms’ actual 
reliance on external finance. To this purpose, we rely on the variable Firm Debt, which 
measures a firm’s total debt as a percentage of its total assets. Table 2 provides summary 
statistics for the three dependent variables in our cross-sectional analysis by country. 
Definitions and sources of all dependent variables are provided in the Appendix. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
3.3  Regression Specification 
We start our empirical analysis with cross-sectional regressions using the BEEPS 2002 
survey data. The baseline specification relates each of our three dependent variables for firm i 
in country j to the information sharing index in the firm’s country, a vector of other country 
characteristics, and a vector of firm characteristics that may affect credit access. Our 
dependent variables were collected during 2002, while information sharing is measured as the 
average value of the index prior to the survey, i.e. 1996-2000. The fact that we relate firm-
level credit indicators to countrywide measures of information sharing and that information 
sharing is predetermined with respect to credit variables should address the potential 
endogeneity of information sharing with respect to credit market performance. 
                                                 
15 Our coding is opposite to that used in the original BEEPS questionnaire, where 4=major obstacle, 
3=moderate obstacle, 2=minor obstacles, 1=no obstacles. This obviously affects only the sign of our 
coefficient estimates, not their absolute magnitude or precision.   11
We include four country-level variables to control for differences in institutions and 
macroeconomic performance: an index of enterprise reform, a measure of foreign bank 
presence, per capita GDP, and the inflation rate. Including these variables is particularly 
important in transition countries, where structural and macroeconomic reforms have 
coincided with the emergence of information sharing, and may also have affected credit 
market performance. The variable Enterprise reform index provides a composite index of 
institutional reforms that make it easier for shareholders and creditors to evaluate and control 
firms’ actions.
16 Higher values of this index reflect reforms that encourage financial discipline 
in companies, improve corporate governance and facilitate the enforcement of bankruptcy 
legislation. This indicator thus covers a wider range of relevant legal and institutional 
conditions than for example the "creditor rights" indicator used by Djankov et al. (2007).
17 
Evidence by Pistor et al. (2000) suggests that transition countries with better corporate 
governance and creditor protection feature higher credit market performance. The variable 
Foreign bank assets measures the share of assets controlled by foreign owned banks in each 
country. Recent evidence suggests that foreign bank entry has improved credit market 
performance in transition countries, reducing intermediation spreads (Bonin, Hasan and 
Wachtel, 2005) and facilitating credit access (Giannetti and Ongena, forthcoming), although 
the benefits from foreign bank presence appear to depend strongly on firm size (Brown and 
Rueda Maurer, 2005). Moreover, foreign bank presence may coincide with information 
sharing, if these banks are familiar with the benefits of credit reports from their home 
markets, and therefore tend to patronize private credit bureaus also in their host countries. We 
include two controls for country specific macroeconomic performance (Per capita GDP, 
Inflation) as previous evidence suggests that macroeconomic stabilization is conducive to 
financial intermediation in transition countries (Fries and Taci, 2002).
 18 
Table 3 provides summary statistics for our country-level explanatory variables, including 
the information sharing index. Definitions and sources of all control variables are provided in 
the Appendix. The table documents strong variation in institutional and macroeconomic 
                                                 
16 In the estimation, we use the 1996-2000 average of the index of enterprise reform.  
17 Our results remain unchanged if we if do include the more narrow indicator of "creditor rights" used 
by Djankov et al. (2007).  
18 For both macroeconomic variables we take the 2000 values to avoid using the extraordinary 
macroeconomic data from the 1998 and 1999 period in which the Russian crisis took place.   12
indicators. The index of enterprise reform ranges from a minimum value of 1 for Serbia to 3.2 
in Hungary. Macroeconomic conditions also range from low inflation (below 2% in Albania, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, and Lithuania) to hyperinflation (above 100% in Belarus). 
Confirming our conjecture, most countries with well developed information sharing systems 
(e.g. Hungary, Czech Republic, and Estonia) also display relatively high levels of institutional 
reform and macroeconomic stability. This confirms the importance of controlling for these 
country-level variables, in order to identify the specific role of information sharing. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
We include seven firm-level explanatory variables to control for the variation in credit risk 
and financing requirements across firms. It is customary to regard larger firms as less risky, 
other things equal. We distinguish small firms from large ones by their number of employees 
(Small firm = 1−49, Large firm ≥ 50). It is also customary to regard younger firms as more 
risky than older firms. However, in transition countries firm age also determines the economic 
regime under which the firm emerged. Thus, while older firms may be less risky in general, 
they may be riskier in transition countries, because they emerged during the pre-transition or 
transition phase. Rather than controlling simply for firm age, we therefore distinguish firms 
by three categories depending on whether they were established before 1989 (pre-transition), 
between 1989 and 1993 (transition), after 1993 (post-transition). 
19 
We further include two control variables for firm ownership. State-owned firm is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the government holds a majority stake in the firm. The effect of this 
variable is ambiguous a priori. On the one hand, state ownership may reduce firm risk in the 
eye of a bank, due to the possible government bailout in case of default. On the other, state 
ownership may increase default risk, owing to the political pressures on management to 
diverge from profit-maximizing policies. Moreover, these firms may receive public funding, 
which reduces their reliance on credit for investment and therefore relieves their credit 
constraint to firm growth. The dummy variable Privatized firm equals one for private firms 
which emerged as the result of a privatization process, and zero for all de-novo private firms. 
A successfully privatized firm may be less risky than a de-novo firm, and therefore may have 
                                                 
19 Including age rather than our three categorical variables does not alter our results.   13
enhanced credit access. Furthermore, they may still have ties to the public sector that make 
them less dependent on bank finance. 
Given the weak legal environment and lack of transparency in corporate governance, 
borrower-lender relationships in transition countries are likely to suffer from severe adverse 
selection and moral hazard. As a consequence banks’ lending decisions might also be affected 
by firm characteristics that improve the transparency of their activities. We capture firm 
transparency by a composite indicator of a firm’s book-keeping and auditing procedures. The 
variable  Transparency  takes the value 0 if a firm does not use international accounting 
standards or external auditors. The variable takes the value 1 if a firm has either international 
accounting standards or an external auditor; while it takes the value 2 if both apply. Of course, 
in general transparency is determined by regulatory standards as well as by firms’ choices, 
and therefore cannot be regarded as an entirely exogenous firm characteristic. For this reason, 
we shall also control for the potential endogeneity of firm-level transparency using 
instrumental variables estimation.  
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
In all our regressions we include sector dummies, to control for different finance needs of 
firms. Table 4 provides summary statistics for our firm-level explanatory variables. 
Definitions and sources of all control variables are again provided in the Appendix. The table 
shows that our sample is dominated by small firms (67%). Exactly half of the firms were 
established after 1993, and are thus categorized as post-transition firms, while a further 28% 
were established in the transition phase of 1989-1993. The majority of firms are privately 
owned, with only a minor share state-owned (14%). Of the 86% privately owned firms in the 
sample, 83% are de-novo firms, implying that a total of 14% of our firms are privatized 
companies. Our sample displays a low level of transparency on average. 
 
4  Cross-sectional Estimates 
Tables 5-7 report cross-sectional estimation results for our three dependent variables based 
on the BEEPS 2002 survey. Table 5 reports full sample and sample split results for the 
dependent variable Access to finance. In all five regressions reported we regress credit access   14
on our information sharing index, controlling for firm characteristics and country-level 
indicators of institutional and macroeconomic reform. Although this dependent variable is 
measured only on an ordinal scale from 1 to 4, we present OLS estimates in Table 5. This 
makes our results easily comparable  with the instrumental variable estimates reported later 
on. However, ordered probit estimates (not reported for brevity) yield identical qualitative 
results to those presented in Tables 5 and 6. 
In all specifications, the standard errors of the estimated coefficients are adjusted for 
cluster effects at the country level. This adjustment is of crucial importance when one 
estimates the impact of a country-level variable on microeconomic data clustered at the 
country level: ignoring the within-country correlation can lead to standard errors that are too 
small, and therefore to conclude that the country-level variable is correlated with the 
dependent variable, whereas in fact it is not. 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
In the first column of the table we report our full-sample estimation. The positive 
coefficient of Information Sharing suggests that, on average, credit access is less of a 
constraint on firm growth in countries where public credit registries or private credit bureaus 
are more developed.
20 The relevant coefficient estimate is not only statistically significant but 
also economically sizeable: for instance, raising the information sharing index from the 
lowest (0) to the highest observed value (4.6) raises the credit access indicator by 0.5, which 
is about 30% of the sample mean (1.69). 
The results in the first regression also show that larger firms, firms that were established in 
the post-transition phase and more transparent firms perceive credit access as less of a growth 
constraint. To give an idea of the economic impact of a change in firm-level transparency, 
consider that a firm with external auditors and international accounting standards has a credit 
access indicator that is about 10% higher than the sample mean. As for macroeconomic 
variables, we find that in countries with lower inflation, credit constraints are lower. The 
                                                 
20 Non-reported regressions suggest that the impact of information sharing through public credit registers or 
private credit bureaus alone are similar in magnitude and significance.   15
coefficients of our other country-level control variables are imprecisely estimated, probably 
due to high correlation between these variables. 
In the second and third column of Table 5 we re-estimate the model separately for opaque 
firms (no international accounting standards, no external auditor) and transparent firms 
(international accounting standards, external auditor, or both), so as to capture the differential 
impact of information sharing by firm transparency. Comparing the coefficient of Information 
sharing index in the second and third column of the table, we see that opaque firms benefit 
more from information sharing than transparent firms. Moreover, the differential impact of 
information sharing by firm transparency is statistically significant.
21 This finding supports 
our conjecture that lenders find information sharing more valuable for firms where accounting 
information is poorer, and therefore adverse selection and incentive problems would 
otherwise be more severe. 
In the fourth and fifth column of Table 5 we conduct a further sample split based on firm 
size. We do not find evidence that small firms benefit more from information sharing than 
large firms. The coefficient of information sharing is positive for both small and large firms. 
While the coefficient for large firms appears to be slightly higher, the difference between the 
two is not statistically significant.
22 
Table 6 reports estimation results when the Cost of finance indicator is the dependent 
variable. Again the reported estimations are based on OLS with standard errors adjusted for 
cluster effects at the country level. Table 6 reports the same full sample and sample split 
specifications as the previous table. The results generally parallel those of Table 5. The 
positive coefficient of information sharing in the first column suggests that, on average, the 
cost of credit is lower in countries where information sharing is more developed, which is 
consistent with the theoretical prediction discussed in Section 2. Also in line with our 
previous results, we find that more transparent firms, larger firms and post-transition firms 
view credit cost as a lower constraint on their operations. A more stable macroeconomic 
                                                 
21 In order to test the statistical significance of this result we run a full-sample OLS regression 
interacting each variable with Transparency. In this regression, the coefficient of the interaction term 
Information Sharing × Transparency yields a negative coefficient of –0.036, which is statistically 
different from zero at the 1 percent level. 
 
22 In order to test the statistical significance of this result we again run a full-sample OLS regression, 
interacting each variable with firm size. The coefficient of the interaction term Information Sharing × 
Small firm is 0.002 and it is not statistically different from zero.   16
environment again seems to reduce firm-level credit constraints, while the results for other 
country-level control variables are again imprecise. In contrast to Table 5, we find that the 
point estimates of the coefficient of the information sharing variable is not only higher for 
opaque firms but also for smaller firms. However, both results lack statistical significance. 
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
Table 7 reports estimates obtained for regressions where Firm Debt is the dependent 
variable. These regressions are estimated with Tobit because the dependent variable is 
censored at zero.
23 The positive coefficient of information sharing in the first columns of 
Table 7 indicates that on average firms are more levered in countries where information 
sharing is more developed: raising the information sharing index from the lowest to the 
highest observed value raises the leverage ratio by about 4.2 percentage points, which is 
almost half the sample mean (9.3%). Again, firm transparency and size have a positive direct 
effect on leverage, with large and highly significant coefficients. 
In contrast to results for our subjective measures of credit access and cost, the results for 
Firm Debt reveal a stronger impact of the macroeconomic and institutional environment. We 
find that firms’ reliance on external finance is positively associated with higher per capita 
income, a stronger presence of foreign banks and weaker enterprise related reforms. The latter 
result suggests that more stringent corporate governance regulation and effective bankruptcy 
legislation may have actually reduced the use of external finance in transition countries. This 
finding contradicts previous empirical results on the benefits of strong company law and 
creditor rights on financial sector development (see e.g. Djankov et al., 2007). However, in 
transition countries where many unworthy, but politically connected borrowers may have 
received credit prior to these reforms, this result may also indicate a positive impact of legal 
reform on credit market efficiency. 
The results of our sample splits in columns 2-5 of Table 7 show that the coefficient of 
information sharing is higher for opaque than for transparent firms. This confirms our 
previous finding that information sharing is more beneficial for opaque firms than for 
                                                 
23 The coefficients reported in this table are not adjusted for cluster effects at country level. However, 
Heckman regressions with standard errors corrected for clustering at the country level yield 
qualitatively similar results.    17
transparent firms. In contrast, small firms do not seem to benefit more from information 
sharing than larger firms. 
 
[Table 7 here] 
 
Our results so far suggest that opaque firms have less access to and higher cost of credit. In 
line with our predictions though, information sharing between banks reduces the credit 
constraints of firms and does so particularly for opaque firms. A potential criticism of these 
results is that firm transparency is not exogenous, as firms can choose their accounting and 
auditing procedures, and may vary these in order to obtain credit. If firm transparency is 
endogenous in our data, then both the estimated effect of opaqueness and information sharing 
may be biased. 
In order to control for the endogeneity of firm transparency we estimate instrumental 
variable regressions of our full sample specification for all three dependent variables. As 
instruments for firm transparency we apply indicators of managerial experience and corporate 
governance. More precisely, we use the age of the firm’s manager, dummy variables to 
capture the education of the manager and dummy variables to capture the major shareholder 
of the firm.
24 The IV estimates reported in Table 8 suggest that the coefficients of 
Transparency are higher than those reported for Access to Finance in Table 5 and Cost of 
Finance in Table 6. In contrast, the coefficient of Transparency reported for Firm Debt in 
Table 7 is higher than in the IV estimates. More importantly, the IV estimates confirm the 
positive and highly significant impact of Information Sharing on all dependent variables. 
 
[Table 8 here] 
 
5  Panel Estimates 
The cross-sectional results reported so far may be biased due to omitted country-level and 
firm-level variables. To tackle these issues, we repeat part of our analysis using a panel 
                                                 
24 An F-test for the over-identifying restrictions suggests that our instrumentation of firm 
transparency is valid. The hypothesis that our instruments are jointly zero in the first-stage equation is 
rejected at the 1% level.   18
generated from the 2002 and 2005 BEEPS. Of the total 9655 firms covered by the BEEPS 
2005, 1457 were also surveyed in 2002. Due to our exclusion of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, 




Unfortunately, the BEEPS 2005 does not contain information on firm’s external debt, so 
that our panel estimates are limited to the dependent variables Access to Finance and Cost of 
Finance. For both variables we effect fixed effects estimates for our two-wave panel, 
regressing the change in the reported credit constraint per firm (2005-2002) on changes in 
firm characteristics (size, transparency) and changes in time-varying country-level indicators 
(information sharing, per capita GDP, foreign bank assets, enterprise reform) over the same 
period. Obviously the effects of time invariant variables (Privatized company, State-owned 
firm, Transition firm, and Post-transition firm) are not identified in these panel estimates. 
Although our panel data set includes two dates only, we do see substantial variation in our 
main explanatory variable. Our information sharing index varies for 14 of 23 countries 
covered in the panel analysis. 
 
[Table 9 here] 
 
 Table 9 reports our firm-level fixed-effects estimates for Access to Finance. As in our 
previous analysis, the first column of the table reports full sample estimates. The significant 
positive coefficient of information sharing in this column confirms our cross-sectional results: 
on average an increase in information sharing is associated with improved credit access for 
firms. It is noteworthy also that the coefficient is similar in size to that of our cross-sectional 
estimates, even though the sample is much smaller and we control for firm-level effects. 
Columns two to five of the table report estimates for sample splits by firm transparency and 
firm size. The results of these sample splits only partly confirm our cross-sectional findings. 
The positive and significant coefficient of information sharing in columns two and three 
suggests that that both opaque and transparent firms benefit from information sharing. 
However, in contrast to our cross-sectional analysis, we do not find a stronger impact of 
information sharing on credit access of opaque firms. Results reported in columns four and   19
five do however suggest that small firms benefit more from information sharing than larger 
firms. 
Table 10 reports our firm-level fixed-effects estimates for Cost of Finance, again based on 
OLS regressions. The estimates reported in this table closely resemble those in Table 9: in 
countries where information sharing has been enhanced firms report that the cost of credit has 
become less of a constraint for their operations. Again the reported coefficient of information 
sharing in the full sample estimate is positive, significant, and similar in size to our cross-
sectional estimate. We further find that the positive impact of information sharing is similar 
for opaque and transparent firms, while small firms seem to benefit more from information 
sharing than larger firms. 
Our panel results could be biased if the firms covered in our panel displayed different 
characteristics than the full sample of firms surveyed in the BEEPS 2002. Indeed, firms in our 
panel report on average lower credit constraints (access and cost) in 2002 than firms which 
were interviewed in 2002 but are not part of the panel. Also, firms included in the panel were 
on average more transparent in 2002 than non-panel firms. However, while statistically 
significant, the differences between panel and non-panel firms from the 2002 survey are only 
marginal in size.




[Table 10 here] 
 
On the whole, our cross-sectional and panel results suggest that, in transition countries, 
information sharing is strongly associated with enhanced credit access and lower credit cost. 
One reason for the substantial impact of information sharing in this region may be the weak 
legal and institutional environment that makes it costly for banks to screen loan applicants and 
enforce credit contracts. In the final two columns of Table 9 and Table 10 we test this 
                                                 
25 The 1333 panel firms report an average indicator of credit "access" of 1.73, of credit "cost" of 
1.53, and of "transparency" of .96 (see the appendix for definitions of these variables). The 
corresponding average indicators for the 4384 non-panel firms in the 2002 survey are 1.68, 1.45, and 
.83 respectively. A t-test confirms that the difference between panel and non-panel firms is statistically 
significant for "access" at the 10% level, for "cost" at the 5% level and for transparency at the 1% 
level.    20
conjecture by exploiting variation in the institutional environment for countries in our sample. 
We split our sample into low reform countries and high reform countries based on their score 
on the Enterprise reform index in 2002 and 2005. We categorize those countries “low reform” 
if their score on this index in both years was below the median value (2.5). According to this 
classification the following countries are labeled as “low reform”: Albania, Armenia, Belarus, 
Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia, 
Ukraine. 
The results in Tables 9 and 10 suggest that within our sample the impact of information 
sharing on credit access and cost was substantially higher for low reform countries. The 
coefficient of information sharing on Access to Finance and Cost of Finance is positive and 
significant for low reform countries (column 6 of each table). In contrast, for high-reform 
countries (column 7 of each table) the coefficient is not significant in either case. These 
results support our conjecture that the observed impact of information sharing on credit access 
and cost is related to the weak institutional environment of many transition countries. The 
negligible impact of information sharing in “high reform” countries also confirms recent 
empirical evidence (Djankov et al., 2007) suggesting that information sharing and conducive 
legal environments are substitutes in fostering credit market development.  
 
 
6  Conclusions 
The transition countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are a unique 
environment to test the effects of institutions on credit market performance, since recently 
they have featured wide variation in institutions both across countries and over time. In this 
paper we investigate the effects of the variation in one such institution, that is, the information 
sharing arrangement among banks between 1996 and 2004, using a large sample of firm-level 
data. The effects of information sharing arrangements are of particular interest in the context 
of transition countries because they may mitigate the effects of the weak protection afforded 
to creditors in most of these jurisdictions. 
The use of firm-level data allows us to test theoretical predictions without the biases that 
composition effects might introduce in tests conducted on aggregate data and to check these 
predictions by splitting the sample by firm characteristics. Our reliance on firm-level data   21
allows us to achieve also a substantial methodological improvement over previous empirical 
studies: we control for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level, and purge 
the estimate of the correlation between information sharing and credit market performance 
from the effects of variation in firm-level characteristics and country-level institutional and 
macroeconomic variables.  
Our cross-sectional and panel estimates show that information sharing is associated with 
improved availability and lower cost of credit, particularly in transition countries with very 
weak legal environments. Our cross-sectional estimates suggest that information sharing and 
firm-level accounting transparency are substitutes in enhancing credit availability: the 
correlation between information sharing and credit access (or the cost of credit) is stronger for 
opaque firms than for transparent ones. Our panel estimates further suggest that the impact of 
information sharing on credit access and cost is stronger for small firms than larger firms. 
Both these results are consistent with the idea that information sharing is particularly valuable 
to guide banks in evaluating credit applicants who would be otherwise costly to screen, due to 
poor accounting information or small loan volumes. Finally, our panel estimates reveal that 
the relation between information sharing and credit access (cost) is stronger in countries with 
weaker legal environments. This result confirms the hypothesis that information sharing is 
particularly valuable to banks in countries where weak company and bankruptcy law increase 
the cost of client screening and contract enforcement. 
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Appendix. Definition of variables 
 
 
1. Firm-level variables (Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey - BEEPS) 
 
Cross sectional analysis (BEEPS 2002): The cross sectional analysis is based on responses by 5717 
firms in 24 transition countries to the BEEPS 2002 questionnaire. By design this data set provides a 
similar sample of non-agricultural firms across all countries. The sample is dominated by small firms 
(67%) and private firms (86%). The sample includes firms from service and manufacturing sectors, 
with the majority of firms (54%) have their main activity in the service sector. All firms in the sample 
are at least 3 years old. 
 
Panel Analysis (BEEPS 2002 & 2005): The panel analysis is based on responses by 1333 firms 
interviewed in both the BEEPS 2002 and 2005 surveys. This represents 14% of the 9655 firms 
covered by the BEEPS 2005 survey. The sample structure for the 2005 survey resembles by design 




Access to finance. Definition: “Can you tell me how problematic is access to finance (e.g. collateral 
requirement) or financing not available from banks for the operation and growth of your business?” 
(1=major obstacle, 2=moderate obstacle, 3=minor obstacle, 4=no obstacle). Source: q80a. 
 
Cost of finance. Definition: How problematic is cost of financing (e.g. interest rates and charges) for 
the operation and growth of your business? (1=major obstacle, 2=moderate obstacle, 3=minor 
obstacle, 4=no obstacle). Source: q80b. 
  





Small Firm. Definition: Dummy Variable if total number of full-time employees less then 50. Source: 
s4a2. 
 
Transition Firm. Definition: Firm was established in the years 1989-1993. Source: s1a. 
 
Post-transition Firm. Definition: Firm was established after 1993. Source: s1a. 
 
State-owned firm. Definition: State controlled firm (yes/no). Source: s2b. 
 
Privatized firm. Definition: privatized firm (yes/no). Source: q9aa. 
  
Transparency.  Based on use of international accounting standards (Source: q73) and of external 
auditor (q74). Transparency equals 0 if the firm does not use international accounting standards or 
external auditors, 1 if it uses of the two, 2 if it uses both. 
  
Sector: Definition: Mining, Construction, Manufacturing transport and communication, Wholesale, 
retail and repairs, Real estate, renting and business service, Hotels and restaurants, Others. Source: q2.  
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Instrumental Variables  
 
Age of manager. Definition: Age of manager in the following categories of years: 20-29, 30-39, 40-
49, 50-59, 60-69, 70-85. Source: q12. 
 
Education of manager. Definition: Dummy variable for highest level of education of the manager in 
the following categories: no secondary school, secondary schools, vocational training, some university 
training, completed university degree, completed higher university degree (masters/doctorate). Source: 
q13. 
 
Firm’s shareholders. Definition: Dummy variable for largest shareholder of the firm in the following 
categories: individual, family, domestic company, foreign company, bank, investment fund, managers 




2. Country-level explanatory variables 
 
Information sharing index. For each year between 1996 and 2004 we compute an index for private 
credit bureaus and one for public credit registers: 1 point if it exists for more than 3 years; 1 point if 
individuals and firms are covered; 1 point if positive and negative data are collected; 1 point if 
PCR/PCB distributes data which is at least 2 years old; 1 point if threshold loan is below per capita 
GDP. We then take the maximum of the index for credit bureaus and public credit registers. Our main 
data source is the Doing Business in 2006 report (World Bank, 2006). 
 
Enterprise Reform Index. Definition: Index of Enterprise Reform (range 1 to 4 1/3 in steps of 1/3). 
1: soft budget constraints and few other reforms to promote corporate governance. 2: 4 1/3: Standards 
and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: effective corporate control exercised 
through domestic financial institutions and markets. Per year, 1996-2003. Source: EBRD transition 
report (EBRD, 2003; EBRD, 2005). 
 
 
Foreign Bank Assets. Definition: Share of banking sector assets controlled by banks with a majority 
(at least 50%) foreign ownership. Per year, 1996-2003. Source: EBRD transition report (EBRD, 2003; 
EBRD, 2005; EBRD, 2006). 
 
Per capita GDP. Definition: Per capita GDP in '000 US$. Per year, 1996-2003. Source: IMF 
International Financial Statistics (IFS): line 99b, line ae, line 99z. 
 
Inflation. Definition: average annual growth rate of CPI. Per year, 1996-2003. Source: IFS (line 64), 
EBRD transition report (EBRD, 2003; EBRD, 2005). 
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Figure 1 
Information Sharing in Transition countries over Time 
 
Values reported in the figure are unweighted averages of the information sharing index and 
the PCR and PCB scores for the 24 transition countries listed in Table 1. In each 
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Table 1. Panel A: Public Credit Registries in Transition Countries 
 
Start of operations: year in which the public credit registry (PCR) started distributing credit records. 
Individuals: PCR covers private individuals. Firms: PCR covers firms. Negative: PCR collects and 
distributes negative information. Positive: PCR collects and distributes positive information. 
Threshold: Minimum Loan size covered by PCR as percentage of GDP per capita. History: Credit 
reports provide information for more than the most recent 2 years. Source: Doing Business in 2006 
(World Bank, 2006); National Bank of Kazakhstan. 
 
 












Albania              
Armenia 2003  x  x  x  x  240   
Azerbaijan 2005  x  x  x  x  107  x 
Belarus              
Bosnia              
Bulgaria 1999  x  x  x  x  208   
Croatia              
Czech Rep.  2002    x  x  x  0  x 
Estonia              
Georgia                
Hungary              
Kazakhstan 1996  x x  x  x 140  x 
Kyrgyz Rep.               
Latvia   2003  x  x  x    0  x 
Lithuania 1995  x  x  x x  86  x 
Macedonia   1998  x  x  x  x  118  x 
Moldova              
Poland              
Romania   2000  x  x  x  x  187  x 
Russia              
Serbia 2002  x  x    x  2995   
Slovak Rep.  1997    x  x  x  0   
Slovenia 1994    x  x  x  0  x 
Ukraine              
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Table 1. Panel B: Private Credit Bureaus in Transition Countries 
 
Start of operations: year in which the private credit bureau (PCB) started distributing credit records. 
Individuals: PCB covers private individuals. Firms: PCB covers firms. Negative: PCB collects and 
distributes negative information. Positive: PCB collects and distributes positive information. 
Threshold: Minimum Loan size covered by PCB as percentage of GDP per capita. History: Credit 
reports provide information for more than the most recent 2 years. Source: Doing Business in 2006 
(World Bank, 2006).. Two stars indicate that a private credit bureau is under construction. 
 
 












Albania             
Armenia  **           
Azerbaijan             
Belarus             
Bosnia 2001  x  x  x  x  0  x 
Bulgaria **             
Croatia **             
Czech Rep.  2002  x  x  x  x  0  x 
Estonia 1993  x  x  x    1  x 
Georgia                
Hungary 1995  x  x  x  x  0  x 
Kazakhstan **            
Kyrgyz Rep.  2003  x    x  x  0  x 
Latvia                
Lithuania 2004  x  x  x    0   
Macedonia                
Moldova              
Poland 2001  x    x  x  0  x 
Romania   2004  x    x    0  x 
Russia **             
Serbia **             
Slovak Rep.  2004  x    x  x  0  x 
Slovenia             
Ukraine              
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Table 2. Access to Credit, Cost of Credit and Ratio of Debt to Total Assets. 
Sample Means 
 
Access to Credit: “How problematic is access to finance for the operation and growth of your 
business?” (1=major obstacle, 2=moderate obstacle, 3=minor obstacle, 4=no obstacle). Cost of Credit: 
“How problematic is the cost of finance (e.g. interest rates and charges) for the operation and growth 
of your business?” (1=major obstacle, 2=moderate obstacle, 3=minor obstacle, 4=no obstacle). Firm 
Debt: Debt as percentage of total assets in 2001. Source: BEEPS 2002. 
 
  Access to finance 
 
Cost of finance  Firm debt  Observations 
Albania 1.93  1.41  19.84  170 
Armenia 1.66  1.48  4.23  171 
Azerbaijan 1.84  1.80  3.45  170 
Belarus 1.53  1.22  7.94  250 
Bosnia 1.48  1.21  12.95  182 
Bulgaria 1.20  1.12  12.87  250 
Croatia 1.82  1.73  14.75  187 
Czech Rep.  1.55 1.47  8.37 268 
Estonia 2.06  1.99  14.77  170 
Georgia   1.79  1.47  6.76  174 
Hungary 1.78  1.69  9.82  250 
Kazakhstan 2.00  1.84 7.64  250 
Kyrgyz Rep.  1.76  1.60  12.26  173 
Latvia   2.15  1.99  10.33  176 
Lithuania 2.38  2.01  13.60  200 
Macedonia   1.92 1.62  6.45 170 
Moldova 1.51  1.05  6.84  174 
Poland 1.35  0.83  7.76  500 
Romania   1.45  1.20  10.86  255 
Russia 1.69  1.76  5.03  506 
Serbia 1.57  1.22  10.59  250 
Slovak Rep.  1.50  1.42  15.35  170 
Slovenia 2.18  1.80  12.95  188 
Ukraine 1.56  1.38  4.53  463 
        
Total 1.69  1.47  9.31  5717 
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Table 3. Country Level Explanatory Variables 
 
The table reports the country-level explanatory variables used in our cross-sectional analysis. See 



















Albania  0.00 2.00  27.05  1.22 0.05 
Armenia 0.00  2.00  44.90  0.61  -0.81 
Azerbaijan 0.00 1.76 4.40 0.63 1.77 
Belarus  0.00 1.14 3.60 0.77  168.62 
Bosnia  0.00 1.70  12.70  1.24 1.90 
Bulgaria  0.80  2.24 59.05 1.59 10.32 
Croatia  0.00 2.70  62.20  4.15 5.27 
Czech Rep  0.00  3.06 51.90 5.54 3.90 
Estonia  4.00 3.00  93.60  4.03 4.03 
Georgia  0.00 2.00  16.75  0.65 4.06 
Hungary  3.80 3.18  64.45  4.52 9.80 
Kazakhstan 3.60  2.00 19.80 1.20 18.69 
Kyrgyzstan 0.00  2.00 20.55 0.27 13.18 
Latvia  0.00 2.76  74.20  3.22 2.65 
Lithuania  4.60 2.76  45.90  3.25 1.01 
Macedonia 2.00  2.06 32.45 1.77 6.61 
Moldova  0.00  2.00 37.10 0.30 31.29 
Poland  0.00  3.00 60.95 4.52 10.06 
Romania  0.60  2.00 45.15 1.40 45.67 
Russia  0.00  1.94 10.05 1.77 20.78 
Serbia  0.00 1.00 0.45 1.03 8.82 
Slovak  Rep 1.20  2.88 33.40 3.65 60.40 
Slovenia  2.80  2.70 10.10 9.51 12.04 
Ukraine  0.00  2.00 10.80 0.64 28.20 
       
Total  0.85  2.25 33.93 2.42 21.04 
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Table 4. Firm-level Control Variables. 
Sample Means 
 
The table reports the country averages of the firm-level control variables used in our cross-sectional 
analysis. See appendix for detailed description of the variables. 
 
 










Albania 0.71  0.17  0.75  0.08  0.11  1.41 
Armenia 0.73 0.09 0.46 0.33 0.18 0.81 
Azerbaijan 0.69  0.13  0.69  0.14  0.15  0.73 
Belarus 0.69  0.30  0.52  0.05  0.18  0.68 
Bosnia 0.60  0.10  0.56  0.23  0.13  1.05 
Bulgaria 0.69 0.29 0.40 0.16 0.15 0.90 
Croatia 0.67  0.36  0.37  0.13  0.15  1.03 
Czech Rep  0.66  0.51  0.38 0.10 0.13 0.57 
Estonia 0.71  0.34  0.58  0.09  0.14  1.71 
Georgia 0.75  0.09  0.66  0.20  0.16  1.32 
Hungary 0.67 0.42 0.33 0.18 0.05 0.90 
Kazakhstan 0.70  0.24  0.62 0.18 0.15 0.86 
Kyrgyzstan 0.62  0.17  0.58  0.24  0.16  0.78 
Latvia 0.70  0.27  0.59  0.11  0.17  1.20 
Lithuania 0.67  0.29  0.54  0.17  0.16  0.97 
Macedonia 0.70  0.28  0.48 0.14 0.04 0.49 
Moldova 0.68 0.16 0.68 0.20 0.16 1.26 
Poland 0.66  0.32  0.33  0.09  0.14  0.72 
Romania 0.60 0.40 0.46 0.13 0.15 0.66 
Russia 0.67  0.23  0.59  0.15  0.13  0.53 
Serbia 0.61  0.31  0.35  0.10  0.17  0.59 
Slovak Rep  0.64  0.42  0.41  0.12  0.15  0.67 
Slovenia 0.77 0.43 0.29 0.20 0.09 0.80 
Ukraine 0.67  0.23  0.57  0.11  0.14  1.03 
        
Total 0.67  0.28  0.50  0.14  0.14  0.86 
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Table 5. Access to Finance 
 
The table reports OLS estimates for “How problematic is access to finance for the operation and 
growth of your business?” (1=major obstacle, 2=moderate obstacle, 3=minor obstacle, 4=no obstacle). 
Each regression includes sector dummies. Opaque firms are those that don’t have external auditors or 
international accounting standards. Transparent firms are those with external auditors or international 
accounting standards. Small and large firms are, respectively, firms with less or more than 50 
employees.  Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for cluster 
effects at the country level. One star indicates that the estimated coefficient is significantly different 
from zero at 10% level; two stars at 5%; three stars at 1%. 
 
 
  Baseline Opaque  Transparent  Small  Large 
 
Information  sharing  0.110 0.158 0.089 0.109 0.117 
  (4.03)*** (7.14)***  (2.62)**  (3.60)*** (4.59)*** 
Transition  firm  0.112 0.102 0.116 0.119 0.072 
 (1.66)  (1.07)  (1.49)  (1.91)*  (0.72) 
Post-transition  firm  0.215 0.154 0.243 0.211 0.216 
 (3.87)***  (1.65)  (3.36)***  (4.06)***  (2.43)** 
Small firm  -0.155  -0.222  -0.150     
 (4.90)***  (2.96)***  (3.22)***     
Privatized  company  0.096 -0.029 0.149 0.180 0.024 
 (1.42)  (0.26)  (1.89)*  (2.08)**  (0.28) 
State-owned  firm  0.135 0.135 0.145 0.132 0.073 
  (1.93)* (1.10) (1.81)* (1.37)  (0.82) 
Transparency  0.146    0.152  0.124 
  (5.44)***    (4.71)***  (3.42)*** 
Per capita GDP  0.034  -0.008  0.054  0.027  0.049 
 (1.84)*  (0.31)  (2.53)**  (1.17)  (2.82)*** 
Inflation  -0.170 -0.207 -0.169 -0.221 -0.076 
  (1.87)*  (2.87)***  (1.36) (2.25)** (0.79) 
Foreign  bank  assets  -0.003 -0.008 -0.000 -0.005 -0.000 
  (1.03)  (2.12)**  (0.02) (1.24) (0.01) 
Enterprise reform index  -0.071  0.174  -0.215  -0.022  -0.168 
  (0.51) (1.05) (1.32) (0.12)  (1.79)* 
Constant  1.519 1.405 1.816 1.272 1.796 
  (6.73)*** (7.30)*** (6.03)*** (4.51)*** (7.56)*** 
       
Observations  5392 2075 3317 3631 1761 
R-squared  0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 
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Table 6. Cost of Finance 
 
The table reports OLS estimates for: “How problematic is cost of financing (e.g. interest rates and 
charges) for the operation and growth of your business?” (1=major obstacle, 2=moderate obstacle, 
3=minor obstacle, 4=no obstacle). Each regression includes sector dummies. Opaque firms are those 
that don’t have external auditors or international accounting standards. Transparent firms are those 
with external auditors or international accounting standards. Small and large firms are, respectively, 
firms with less or more than 50 employees. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard 
errors are adjusted for cluster effects at the country level. One star indicates that the estimated 
coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10% level; two stars at 5%; three stars at 1%. 
 
 
 Baseline  Opaque  Transparent  Small  Large 
 
Information  sharing  0.126 0.139 0.110 0.132 0.110 
 (2.95)***  (3.62)***  (2.38)**  (3.03)***  (2.46)** 
Transition  firm  0.086 0.049 0.083 0.090 0.045 
  (1.23) (0.35) (1.13) (1.28) (0.49) 
Post-transition  firm  0.157 0.053 0.196 0.163 0.137 
 (2.35)**  (0.46)  (2.23)**  (2.57)**  (1.23) 
Small firm  -0.081  -0.216  -0.040     
 (1.74)*  (2.81)***  (0.62)     
Privatized  company  0.066 0.035 0.084 0.167 -0.030 
 (1.10)  (0.39)  (1.00)  (2.05)*  (0.33) 
State-owned  firm  0.205 0.202 0.195 0.221 0.164 
 (2.91)***  (1.39)  (2.55)**  (2.65)**  (1.60) 
Transparency  0.065    0.091  -0.015 
  (2.43)**    (2.48)**  (0.41) 
Per capita GDP  -0.002  -0.061  0.026  -0.005  0.004 
  (0.10) (2.00)* (1.04)  (0.18)  (0.19) 
Inflation  -0.205 -0.217 -0.195 -0.195 -0.234 
 (2.04)*  (3.00)***  (1.45)  (1.73)*  (2.35)** 
Foreign  bank  assets  -0.004 -0.012 -0.001 -0.005 -0.002 
 (1.13)  (2.59)**  (0.23)  (1.22)  (0.55) 
Enterprise reform index  0.045  0.368  -0.092  0.038  0.055 
  (0.24) (1.95)* (0.42)  (0.17)  (0.38) 
Constant  1.283 1.149 1.436 1.209 1.323 
  (4.16)*** (5.88)*** (3.37)*** (3.26)*** (4.80)*** 
       
Observations  5450 2093 3357 3661 1789 
R-squared  0.05 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.05 
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Table 7. Firm Debt 
 
The table reports Tobit regression estimates for the ratio of total debt to total assets (expressed in 
percentage values). Each regression includes sector dummies. Opaque firms are those that don’t have 
external auditors or international accounting standards. Transparent firms are those with external 
auditors or international accounting standards. Small and large firms are, respectively, firms with less 
or more than 50 employees. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. One star indicates that the 
estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10% level; two stars at 5%; three stars at 
1%. 
 
  Baseline 
 
Opaque Transparent  Small  Large 
Information  sharing  0.913 2.411 0.318 0.661 1.282 
 (2.22)**  (3.12)***  (0.65)  (1.25)  (1.93)* 
Transition  firm  2.637 1.297 3.177 2.840 3.607 
  (1.50) (0.39) (1.54) (1.08) (1.49) 
Post-transition  firm  1.741 0.576 2.579 2.028 1.066 
  (1.01) (0.17) (1.28) (0.81) (0.43) 
Small firm  -9.127  -1.898  -11.050     
 (6.65)***  (0.66)  (7.08)***     
Privatized company  2.977  4.839  2.071  -4.066  8.088 
 (1.65)*  (1.28)  (1.01)  (1.47)  (3.33)*** 
State-owned  firm  4.513 8.701 3.281 2.555 8.529 
 (2.33)**  (2.21)**  (1.48)  (0.84)  (3.28)*** 
Transparency  3.774    3.887  3.798 
  (4.97)***    (4.01)***  (3.03)*** 
Per  capita  GDP  2.760 2.885 2.603 3.227 1.964 
  (6.14)*** (3.71)*** (4.67)*** (5.70)*** (2.62)*** 
Inflation -1.340  2.912  -4.935  -3.209  1.469 
  (0.74) (1.00)  (2.10)**  (1.37) (0.51) 
Foreign  bank  assets  0.289 0.249 0.305 0.331 0.215 
  (7.39)*** (3.28)*** (6.61)*** (6.62)*** (3.41)*** 
Enterprise reform index  -13.991  -14.925  -13.624  -19.131  -5.712 
  (6.00)*** (3.80)*** (4.55)*** (6.33)***  (1.56) 
Constant  -5.399 -10.903 0.934  -2.538 -27.698 
  (1.15) (1.42) (0.16) (0.43)  (3.74)*** 
       
Observations  5717 2211 3506 3856 1861 
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Table 8. Instrumental Variable Estimates 
 
The table reports Instrumental Variables estimates for three dependent variables: Access to Finance 
(OLS estimates), Cost of Finance (OLS estimates), and Firm Debt (Tobit estimates). The instruments 
for transparency are: age of manager, five dummies for the education of the manager, and ten 
dummies for the type of the firm’s largest shareholder. Each regression includes sector dummies. 
Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for cluster effects at the 
country level. One star indicates that the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at 
10% level; two stars at 5%; three stars at 1%. 
 
 
  Access to finance 
 
Cost of finance  Firm debt 
Information  sharing  0.091 0.115 1.081 
 (3.05)***  (2.88)***  (2.52)** 
Transition  firm  0.099 0.081 2.979 
 (1.31)  (1.11)  (1.69)* 
Post-transition  firm  0.202 0.150 2.046 
 (3.41)***  (2.33)**  (1.18) 
Small firm  0.003  0.014  -10.640 
 (0.08)  (0.39)  (5.83)*** 
Privatized  company  0.022 0.026 3.914 
 (0.30)  (0.41)  (2.06)** 
State-owned  firm 0.089 0.182 4.922 
 (1.33)  (2.76)**  (2.50)** 
Transparency  0.537 0.295 0.225 
 (5.03)***  (3.52)***  (0.07) 
Per capita GDP  0.052  0.008  2.620 
 (2.18)**  (0.27)  (5.59)*** 
Inflation -0.130  -0.178  -1.637 
 (1.57)  (1.90)*  (0.89) 
Foreign bank assets  -0.005  -0.005  0.301 
 (1.52)  (1.42)  (7.30)*** 
Enterprise reform index  -0.062  0.056  -14.012 
 (0.45)  (0.32)  (6.02)*** 
Constant 1.131  1.033  -1.813 
 (4.37)***  (3.43)***  (0.33) 
     
Observations  5355 5412 5678 
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Table 9. Fixed Effects Panel Estimates: Access to Finance 
 
The table reports OLS estimates with firm-level fixed effects using the panel component of the 2002 
and 2005 BEEPS. The dependent variable is: “How problematic is access to finance for the operation 
and growth of your business?” (1=major obstacle, 2=moderate obstacle, 3=minor obstacle, 4=no 
obstacle). Opaque firms are those that did not have external auditors or international accounting 
standards in both 2002 and 2005. Transparent firms are those with external auditors or international 
accounting standards in both 2002 and 2005. Small and large firms are, respectively, firms with less or 
more than 50 employees in both 2002 and 2005. The groups of High and Low reform countries are 
defined on the basis of the Enterprise reform index. High reform countries are those where the value of 
this index is higher then the median value (2.5) in both 2002 and 2005: Croatia, Czech Rep, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Rep, Slovenia. Low reform countries are those where the 
value of this index is lower then the median value (2.5) in both 2002 and 2005: Albania, Armenia, 
Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia, 
Ukraine. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. One star indicates that the estimated coefficient is 
significantly different from zero at 10% level; two stars at 5%; three stars at 1%. 
 











Information  sharing  index 0.160 0.207 0.229 0.172 0.057 0.227 -0.119 
  (3.49)***  (2.19)**  (3.28)*** (2.90)*** (0.66) (3.16)*** (1.36) 
Small  firm  0.208  0.135  0.197    0.230  0.072 
  (1.47)  (0.31)  (1.13)    (1.29)  (0.28) 
Transparency  0.060      0.017 0.194 0.034 0.147 
 (1.13)      (0.26)  (1.89)*  (0.48)  (1.56) 
Per capita GDP  0.017  0.011  0.062  0.031  -0.027  0.052  -0.103 
  (0.62) (0.19) (1.60) (0.91) (0.51) (0.31)  (2.08)** 
Inflation -0.002  -0.003  -0.004  -0.004 -0.000 -0.001 -0.023 
  (1.12)  (0.93)  (1.53) (1.97)** (0.10)  (0.53)  (3.24)***
Foreign  bank  assets  -0.001 0.010 -0.005 -0.004 0.004 -0.007 -0.006 
  (0.35) (1.38) (1.24) (1.11) (0.71) (0.94) (1.48) 
Enterprise  reform  index  -0.022 0.006 0.001 -0.026 -0.015     
  (0.90) (0.14) (0.02) (0.91) (0.25)     
Constant  -0.008 -0.276 -0.101 -0.027 0.177 -0.043 0.569 
  (0.09) (1.41) (0.85) (0.24) (1.04) (0.31)  (2.65)***
Number  of  firms  1208  293 583 791 311 683 460 
R-squared  0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 
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Table 10. Fixed Effects Panel Estimates: Cost of Finance 
 
The table reports regression estimates with firm-level fixed effects using the panel component of the 
2002 and 2005 BEEPS. The dependent variable is: “How problematic is cost of financing (e.g. interest 
rates and charges) for the operation and growth of your business?” (1=major obstacle, 2=moderate 
obstacle, 3=minor obstacle, 4=no obstacle). Opaque firms are those that did not have external auditors 
or international accounting standards in both 2002 and 2005. Transparent firms are those with external 
auditors or international accounting standards in both 2002 and 2005. Small and large firms are, 
respectively, firms with less or more than 50 employees in both 2002 and 2005. The groups of High 
and Low reform countries are defined on the basis of the Enterprise reform index. High reform 
countries are those where the value of this index is higher then the median value (2.5) in both 2002 
and 2005: Croatia, Czech Rep, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Rep, Slovenia. 
Low reform countries are those where the value of this index is lower then the median value (2.5) in 
both 2002 and 2005: Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. One 
star indicates that the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10% level; two stars 
at 5%; three stars at 1%. 
 











Information  sharing  index  0.136 0.186 0.170 0.177 0.057 0.179 0.008 
  (3.07)*** (2.08)**  (2.54)** (3.18)*** (0.63)  (2.62)***  (0.09) 
Small  firm  0.167  -0.006  0.251    0.115  0.211 
  (1.23)  (0.01)  (1.54)    (0.68)  (0.85) 
Transparency  0.080    0.043  0.154  0.088  0.095 
  (1.54)    (0.68)  (1.47)  (1.29)  (1.04) 
Per capita GDP  0.042  0.048  0.042  0.067  -0.016  -0.109  -0.076 
  (1.58) (0.89) (1.14)  (2.08)**  (0.30) (0.67) (1.58) 
Inflation  -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 -0.017 
 (3.05)***  (1.63)  (2.21)**  (2.37)**  (2.09)**  (2.73)***  (2.50)** 
Foreign  bank  assets  -0.000 0.007 -0.004 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.13) (1.00) (1.06) (0.73) (0.65) (0.46) (0.90) 
Enterprise  reform  index  -0.043 -0.031 -0.040 -0.040 -0.027     
  (1.77)*  (0.76) (0.91) (1.48) (0.44)     
Constant  -0.130 -0.359 -0.058 -0.189 0.048 -0.082 0.398 
  (1.52) (1.90)* (0.51) (1.77)* (0.27)  (0.62) (1.91)* 
         
Number  of  firms  1218  294 590 795 315 669 485 
R-squared  0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 
 
 
 
 
 